Showing posts with label stand watie. Show all posts
Showing posts with label stand watie. Show all posts

Thursday, March 8, 2012

The Battle of Pea Ridge, Arkansas - Day Two

The ground across which the Union army attacked
The learn about the first day of the Battle of Pea Ridge, please click here: Day One, Part One.

The sun rose over the Pea Ridge battlefield on March 8, 1862, 150 years ago today, to find the Union army completing its 180 degree change of front and the Confederate army hungry, exhausted and low on ammunition:

...The sun rose above the horizon before our troops were all in position and yet the enemy had not renewed the attack. I was hardly ready to open fire on him, as the First and Second Divisions had not yet moved into position. Our troops that rested on their arms in the face of the enemy, seeing him in motion, could not brook delay, and the center, under Colonel Davis, opened fire. The enemy replied with terrible energy from new batteries and lines which had been prepared for us during the night. - Gen. Samuel Curtis, USA, April 1, 1862.

Col. Jefferson C. Davis, USA
The opening of the second day of the battle by the men of Colonel Jefferson C. Davis ignited an artillery duel for which the Union army was much better prepared. Curtis moved his batteries into position to create a crossfire that swept the Confederates with shot and shell from multiple directions.

The Southern batteries simply could not match the intensity of fire of the Federal guns. A portion of Van Dorn's army was positioned in the large rock and ravines of the mountain and the exploding shells shattered rock in all directions, inflicting gruesome injuries on these soldiers.

Curtis ordered forward his infantry in a staggered attack that began with the advance of his left:

Position from which the Union left wing attacked
...The left wing, advancing rapidly, soon began to ascend the mountain cliff, from which the artillery had driven most of the rebel force. The upward movement of the gallant Thirty-sixth Illinois, with its dark-blue line of men and its gleaming bayonets, steadily rose from base to summit, when it dashed forward into the forest, driving and scattering the rebels from these commanding heights. The Twelfth Missouri, far in dvance of others, rushes into the enemy's lines, bearing off a flag and two pieces of artillery. Everywhere our line moved forward and the foe as gradually withdrew. - Gen. Samuel Curtis, USA, April 1, 1862.

Telegraph Road, along which part of the Southern army retreated
NPS Photo
As the Federal lines of battle moved forward, the Confederate army disintegrated. In the words of General Curtis, "no force could have withstood our converging line and concentrated cross-fire."

Hungry, tired, out of ammunition, the Confederates realized the battle was lost. According to Van Dorn, he ordered a withdrawal from the field that was carried out orderly and with little pursuit. General Albert Pike, however, told a different story. Pike was not even informed that Van Dorn was leaving the field and went forward for orders to find that the Federal troops were 150 yards away and that the Confederate commander was long gone:

Gen. Albert Pike, CSA
Pike described a disorganized but unhurried retreat of streaming lines of troops from their positions on the main line of battle. The Arkansas general described riding among these men trying to keep them organized as much as possible. He began positioning troops to make a stand on level ground north of the battlefield, but as he moved to bring other men into line, he turned around to find that the line had evaporated and the men once again were moving north. He rushed to catch up with them and tried a second time:

...I rode again to the front and halted the leading battery at the foot of the next level, ordered it into line, facing the rear, gave the necessary commands myself, and had three guns brought into position. Two regiments of infantry were standing there in lines ranging up and down the valley, the flank of each to the enemy. I directed them to form in the rear of the batteries; but at this moment a shell was sent by the enemy up the road from the point of the hill around which we had just passed. The cry of "The cavalry are coming" was raised and everything became confusion. - Gen. Albert Pike, CSA, March 14, 1862.

Gen. Samuel Curtis, USA
Victor of Pea Ridge
Had Albert Pike not assumed command of the Confederate cavalry still on the field and ordered it into position to protect the retreating infantry and artillery, Van Dorn's army might well have been completely destroyed. His impromptu rear guard, however, confused and delayed the Federal pursuit long enough for most of the disorganized Confederate army to escape.

Other officers, particularly those of the Missouri State Guard, also fought delaying actions as the army retreated. It is worth noting that the 200 or so mounted men of Colonel Stand Watie's First Cherokee Rifles were among the last Confederate troops to leave the field.

The Battle of Pea Ridge ended in disaster for the Confederacy, 150 years ago today.

I will post more on the aftermath of the battle in coming days, so be sure to check back often. You can read more about the Battle of Pea Ridge anytime at www.exploresouthernhistory.com/pearidgeindex.

Wednesday, March 7, 2012

The Battle of Pea Ridge, Arkansas - A Lull in the Battle

Confederate Position on night of March 7, 1862
This is part three of a series of posts on the 150th anniversary of the Battle of Pea Ridge, Arkansas. To read the previous parts first, please see: The Battle of Pea Ridge, Arkansas - Day One, Part One and The Battle of Pea Ridge, Arkansas - Day One, Part Two.

The night of March 7, 1862, brought an end to the bloody first day of the Battle of Pea Ridge. The moans and cries of the wounded echoed off the rocks of the ridge and the bodies of the dead carpeted the ground. On the Federal side of the battlefield, General Curtis positioned his line of battle in the edge of trees, with a wide and open field in front of them and there they slept on their arms for the night:

Union Military Map of the Pea Ridge Battlefield
...I directed a detail from each company to bring water and provisions, and thus without a murmur these weary soldiers lay and many of them slept within a few yards of the foe, with their dead and wounded comrades scattered around them. Darkness, silence, and fatigue soon secured to the weary broken slumbers and gloomy repose. The day had closed in some reverses on the right, but the left had been unassailed and the center had driven the foe from the field. - Gen. Samuel Curtis, USA, April 1, 1862.

Realizing that the fight would reopen the next morning along what had been his right flank, General Curtis completed the 180 degree pivot of his army by concentrating the entire Federal force along his final line of the day. The plan was for him to be able to resume the battle on the morning of the 8th with his entire army ready to fight on the front opened by the Confederates along the Telegraph road.

Elkhorn Tavern
Inside Confederate Lines on the night of March 7, 1862
On the Confederate side of the field, General Van Dorn assessed the situation that night to find that he was far from ready to resume another full day of battle:

...In the course of the night I ascertained that the ammunition was almost exhausted, and that the officer in charge of the ordnance supplies could not find his wagons, which, with the subsistence train, had been sent to Bentonville. Most of the troops had been without any food since the morning of the 6th and the artillery horses were beaten out. It was therefore with no little anxiety that I awated the dawn of day.- Gen. Earl Van Dorn, CSA, March 27, 1862.

Gen. William Y. Slack, CSA
The speed with which Van Dorn had marched his army into battle now turned on him. He had entered the engagement at Pea Ridge with a larger army than his Federal opponents, but he had not given proper care to his logistics or the condition of his men. Now, with one entire division of his army disorganized and confused, he found that his men had no food and very little ammunition.

In addition, he had lost a large number of his senior officers in the first day's fighting. In McCulloch's Division, Generals Ben McCulloch and James McIntosh had been killed and Colonel Louis Hebert, who had then assumed command, was missing and feared dead. In Price's Division, General William Y. Slack had been mortally wounded during the early phases of the attack down the Telegraph road. He would die two weeks later.

Col Stand Watie, CSA
To make matters worse, most of the troops of McCulloch's Division did not move to Van Dorn's position during the night. When he came up after another night of marching, General Pike (who had assumed command of McCulloch's battered force) was able to bring up only a portion of the infantry, Welch's cavalry squadron from Texas, a single battery and Colonel Stand Watie's First Cherokee Rifles. He reached Telegraph road to find all in confusion and spent hours trying to find General Van Dorn and receive orders as to where he should place his men.

As Van Dorn and Price tried to prepare for a resumption of the action the next day, their men lay exhausted and hungry on the cold ground. They had not eaten in 36 hours and were dangerousloy low on ammunition. From the Federal side of the field they could hear with their own ears evidence that the enemy was preparing to resume the fight:

Pea Ridge National Military Park
View from the Union lines on the night of March 7, 1862
...During the night great commotion was audible in the camp of the enemy. Their artillery and baggage wagons seemed to be continually moving. The officers of my command preserved their lines unbroken, in readiness for any emergency. - Col. Henry Little, First Brigade Missouri Volunteers (CSA), March 18, 1862.

About the only good news received by any of the Confederate troops that night came in the middle of the night when Colonel Henry Little's First Missouri Brigade received an unexpected gift from the Union army:

...About midnight the sound of wheels approached. We opened our lines and admitted a caisson with ammunition, which, through mistake of the driver, came to seek one of the divisions of the Federal army in the ranks of his adversaries. - Col. Henry Little, First Brigade Missouri Volunteers (CSA), March 18, 1862.

So passed the night of March 7, 1862, and predawn hours of March 8, 1862, 150 years ago tonight. I will post on the second day of the battle tomorrow, so be sure to check back! Until then, you can read more at www.exploresouthernhistory.com/pearidgeindex.

Saturday, March 3, 2012

March 3, 1862 - Van Dorn reaches the Boston Mountains

Confederate Camp in Boston Mountains
On March 3, 1862, 150 years ago today, Confederate General Earl Van Dorn reached the camps of the combined forces of Sterling Price and Ben McCulloch in the Boston Mountains between Fayetteville and the Arkansas River:

...[B]eing satisfied that the enemy, who had halted at Sugar Creek, 55 miles distant, was only waiting large re-enforcements before he would advance, I resolved to attack him at once. Accordingly I sent for General Pike to join me near Elm Springs with the forces under his command. - Gen. Earl Van Dorn, March 27, 1862.

Van Dorn's plan was solid, but he was so determined to attack that he moved before he had a full understanding of the logistics of the situation facing him. As a result he would outrace his supplies, a critical mistake if the coming battle should last for more than one day.

Gen. Albert Pike, CSA
On the same day, even before receiving the commanding general's orders, General Albert Pike had marched from Park Hill in the Cherokee Nation with O.C. Welch's squadron of Texans, the First Choctaw and Chickasaw Regiment and Colonel D.N. McIntosh's Creek Regiment. His immediate objectives were the towns of Evansville and Cincinnati, on the border between Arkansas and the Cherokee Nation. Colonel Stand Watie was waiting in Cincinnati with his Second Mounted Cherokee Rifles and would join Pike's force as he advanced.


Col. Stand Watie, CSA
Van Dorn, meanwhile, would march out from the camps in the Boston Mountains the next morning and engage the Federals at Pea Ridge just three days later on the 7th. 


His strategy was to swing around the right flank of the Union army of General Samuel Curtis, which was then encamped and entrenched on the north side of Sugar Creek in Benton County, Arkansas. If he could carry out this movement quickly and without being detected, Van Dorn believed he could launch simultaneous attacks on Curtis's right flank and rear, destroying the Union army before it knew what had hit it.


I will continue to post on the 150th anniversary of the Battle of Pea Ridge tomorrow, so check back then to learn about the Confederate march from the mountains. Until then you can read more about the Battle of Pea Ridge at www.exploresouthernhistory.com/pearidgeindex.



Thursday, March 1, 2012

Pea Ridge #15 - Arkansas Rallies to oppose the Invasion

As General Earl Van Dorn scrambled to pull together a Confederate army to oppose the occupation of Northwest Arkansas by strong Federal forces, he was gratified by the speed with which the men of Arkansas responded to his call.

Boston Mountains of Arkansas
The following report from the Pocahontas Herald appeared in the Louisiana Daily True Delta on March 4, 1862. While the report was not dated, it appears to have been written around the first of March (150 years ago today) and details the rapid movement of men from throughout Arkansas to the Boston Mountains:

ARKANSAS RALLYING. - From all parts of the State, says the Pocahontas Herald, we hear the most flattering acconts of volunteering, and think that by the 5th of March over 10,000 sons of Arkansas will have enrolled their names and offered their services for the glorious cause of liberty and southern rights. In this county alone, fully three hundred men will go forth to battle under the late call, and we hear that other counties adjoining us are doing nearly as well. To talk of drafting Arkansians is sheer nonsense. If the men are needed all that is necessary is to call them out and furnish them guns to fight with. - Louisiana Daily True Delta, March 4, 1862.

Arkansas River landing at Van Buren
The men were reinforcements for the forces of Confederate Generals Ben McCulloch, Sterling Price and James McIntosh, all of which were positioned south of the Boston Mountains ridge in Crawford County.

Although Union General Samuel Curtis did not know it, the initiative that he had maintained so well in his advance down through Missouri and into Arkansas was now beginning to shift. A naturally aggressive officer, Van Dorn would move with characteristic speed to try to destroy his Federal counterpart. The Battle of Pea Ridge was now less than one week away.

In addition to the rapid movement of men, cannon and supplies to the south side of the Boston Mountains near Van Buren, troops also were on the march from the Indian Territory of today's Oklahoma. Brigadier General Albert Pike had marched for Northwest Arkansas on February 28th and was slowly moving for the Arkansas line near which he expected to link up with the Cherokee troops of Colonel Stand Watie. Together they would move thousands of Native American troops forward to take part in the Battle of Pea Ridge.

I will begin to accelerate my postings on the 150th anniversary of the Battle of Pea Ridge tomorrow, so be sure to check back regularly. You can also read more anytime at www.exploresouthernhistory.com/pearidgeindex.
 

Saturday, December 3, 2011

December 3, 1862: The March to Prairie Grove Begins

Crawford County Courthouse
Van Buren, Arkansas
On December 3, 1862, 149 years ago today, Confederate Major General Thomas C. Hindman began his march from Van Buren into the Boston Mountains. The move would reach its climactic moment four days later at the massive Battle of Prairie Grove.
Hindman's army consisted of the First Corps of what Confederate reports called the Trans-Mississippi Army. The column put in motion on the 3rd included roughly 9,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry and 22 pieces of field artillery. Supplies were limited and he did not have enough shoes or arms for all of his men and was forced to leave many behind.

Hindman's primary objective was Union Brigadier General James G. Blunt's force at Cane Hill. When Blunt had attacked and taken Cane Hill (now spelled Canehill) on December 28, he had placed himself in an advanced position far from the support of other Union troops under Brigadier General Francis J. Herron in southern Missouri. Hindman quickly recognized this opportunity and hoped to sweep across the mountains and destory Blunt before he could be reinforced:

Boston Mountains
...My intention was to attack Brigadier-General Blunt, on Cane Hill, reported to have between 7,000 and 8,000 men and 30 cannon. I expected... to return immediately after the engagement, having barely ammunition enough for one battle, and not sufficient subsistence and forage for seven days at half rations. These meager supplies had been accumulated with extreme difficulty by hauling in wagons of the general train and regiments 80 miles, my transportation being very limited, the country around me entirely exhausted, and the river two low for navigation. - Maj. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman, December 25, 1862.

Hindman acknowledged at the time that his supply situation had become critical and he anticipated having to move his army to Little Rock soon. He felt for the security of the Arkansas River valley, however, that he needed to drive off Blunt before he went.

Marmaduke's cavalry division moved out ahead of the main force, leaving Dripping Springs with the main body of his horsemen on the Telegraph or Wire road that ran largely along ridge tops through the Boston Mountains. Smaller bodies of Confederate cavalry moved up parallel roads, scouting ahead of the infantry and artillery.

Van Buren, Arkansas
Confederate base in thePrairie Grove Campaign
To the west in the Cherokee Nation, Colonel Stand Watie was ordered to advance with his command to the community of Evansville on the Arkansas line. When he heard the sounds of battle, he was to move forward and, if possible, attack and take the enemy's supply wagons.

The main body then moved north on the Telegraph road from Van Buren, heading for the mountains. The column was long and the men were weak and hungry even before they started their march. As a result, the progress of the march was extremely slow. It would take three days for Hindman to emerge from the mountains at Prairie Grove, a distance that can be driven today by car in just a few minutes over an hour.

The move into the mountains was a bold gamble by Hindman, but one that had a good chance of working if he could put his army into position near Cane Hill before Blunt realized what was up. Destroying Blunt's command would open the door to all kinds of possibilities, the least of which would be the reoccupation of Northwest Arkansas by Confederate forces for the winter.  Hindman was careful not to give this as an objective, but the idea must have been on his mind.

I will continue to post on the Prairie Grove campaign over coming days, so be sure to check back regularly. Until the next post, you can read more about the Battle of Prairie Grove by visiting www.exploresouthernhistory.com/ArkansasPG1.

Wednesday, September 9, 2009

Massard Prairie, Part Four - The Attack on Fort Smith, continued...


The halt by Confederate troops to collect supplies, arms and food abandoned by the retreating Federals gave the Union forces in Fort Smith time to the attack.

Rallying on the hill around Fort No. 2, the Federals reorganized and - with reinforcements coming up from the main garrison - moved forward to renew the fight. Advancing to a hill about one mile south of the fort, a section of the 2nd Kansas Battery took up a position from which it could fire on Watie's Confederates. Two companies from the 1st Kansas Infantry (Colored) moved up in support of the battery. The entire operation was carried out under fire from the Confederate guns on the next hilltop south.

One of the Confederate shells exploded near Colonel Judson of the 6th Kansas Cavalry, a fragment wounding him in the left leg. Despite his injuries, however, the colonel remained on the field for the rest of the fight.

The four Union cannon were of better quality and range than the Confederate guns and this superiority soon began to tell. Unwilling to sacrifice his own cannon for the sake of a demonstration, General Cooper ordered the Southern howitzers to pull back. As they were doing so, a Union shell exploded directly over the Confederate battery teams, killing 3 men and wounding another. A second shot decapitated one of General Gano's men. After completing his work on Massard Prairie, Gano had come across the ridge to join the fight.

The effectiveness and range of the Federal artillery convinced Cooper to end his demonstration and pull back. Leaving sharpshooters from his Native American units to hover around the edges of Fort Smith, he effectively pinned the Union troops in position while he withdrew the main body.

Losses in the fight had been relatively light considering the sizes of the two forces engaged. The Confederates suffered one killed, one mortally wounded and five wounded. Union forces lost 11 men killed and wounded, at least one of them killed.

With minimal losses, Cooper was able to achieve his goal of giving pro-Southern families in the area a chance to evacuate. Several moved out under the cover of his troops. His men also inflicted terror on pro-Union families living on the battlefield, burning their homes and carrying away livestock and supplies.

As the Confederates pulled back from the edges of Fort Smith, they heard the sounds of heavy artillery fire coming from the main fort. They later learned that Captain Gunter and his Cherokee troops were amusing themselves by firing into the fort from the cover of trees across the Poteau River. The Federals responded by rolling cannon out of the fort and firing at the smoke of the Cherokee rifles. The Indian soldiers simply changed positions and continued their sniping, leading to more artillery fire. Otherwise, though, the Massard Prairie expedition was over.

I'll look closer at the results of the attacks in the next post. Until then you can learn more by visiting www.exploresouthernhistory.com/massardindex or by reading The Battle of Massard Prairie, available for either at the upper right of this page or at www.amazon.com.

Tuesday, August 18, 2009

Battle of Massard Prairie, Part Three - The Attack on Fort Smith


The stunning success of Gano's attack on the 6th Kansas Cavalry at Massard Prairie awakened the Confederates to the potential of additional attacks on the Union forces at Fort Smith.

Anxious to inflict additional damage, capture more supplies and create an opportunity for pro-secession families in the area to evacuate, the Southern commanders contemplated the situation and decided to try a second attack. Commanded in person by General Douglas H. Cooper, the Confederate troops moved up to Cedar Prairie on the Fort Towson Road due south of Fort Smith.

While Cooper believed that he might be able to break through the defenses of Fort Smith, he also recognized that doing so would result in severe casualties to his own command. Instead of attempting such an attack, he decided instead to send troops to demonstrate against the southern edges of Fort Smith from all directions. Gano was sent to occupy a position on the mountain overlooking Massard Prairie (today's Fianna Hills subdivision). From there he sent Lieutenant Colonel Jack McCurtain down onto the prairie with his force of Choctaw soldiers. McCurtain found the former camp of the 6th Kansas now abandoned, but did manage to captured a few horses, a drove of cattle and 11 Union soldiers.

At the same time, the 2nd Creek Regiment and a few Cherokee soldiers were sent up into the Poteau Bottom opposite the Poteau River from the main garrison of Fort Smith. Taking up positions along the bank, they fired across into the garrison, creating "great excitement and some consternation."

As these activities were underway, Cooper advanced up the Fort Towson (today's Towson Avenue) and State Line Roads toward the Federal positions along the south side of Fort Smith. The historic city had been enclosed with a semi-circular line of rifle pits that connected strong redoubts or forts placed on high points around the city. One of these, Battery Number Four, stood on the high hill near today's intersection of Towson and Dodson Avenues. Because the fort was manned by African American troops, the hill was described in Confederate reports as "Negro Hill." The photo above was taken from a position near the site of Battery Number 4 at the top of the hill looking south down Towson Avenue, the route by which part of Cooper's force attacked.

Advancing on the morning of July 31, 1864, Cooper's forces overran a Union picket camp about 4 1/2 miles south of town and continued to drive up the parallel roads toward Battery Number Four.

Led by Brigadier General Stand Watie, the Confederate advance struck hard and fast, quickly closing in on the Union lines. Overrunning a Union camp and driving the Federals to their entrenchments, Watie and his men fell back to the camp they had captured where they sat down and enjoyed a "plentiful dinner" just prepared by the Union soldiers. They also captured a vast supply of camp equipment and other supplies, the value of which was estimated by General Cooper to be in excess of $130,000.

To support the attack, Cooper ordered forward two batteries of light artillery to take position on a hill overlooking the camp captured by General Watie and facing the hill topped by Battery Number Four. Wells' Texas Battalion, the Choctaw Brigade and the 1st Creek Regiment were ordered forward to support the guns.

I'll continue with more on Cooper and Watie's attack on Fort Smith in the next post. You can always read more on the Battle of Massard Prairie by visiting www.exploresouthernhistory.com/massardprairie.

Wednesday, March 4, 2009

Native Americans at the Battle of Pea Ridge


The artillery position shown here is visible beyond the interpretive stop at Pea Ridge battlefield that explains the role of General Albert Pike's Indian Brigade during the battle.

Ordered by Van Dorn to bring as many men as possible to join the attack on Curtis's army and planned invasion of Missouri, Pike arrived from the Indian Territory (today's Oklahoma) with a large force of warriors that curiously included men who favored both the Confederacy and the Union. It was an oddity of the Battle of Pea Ridge that both Unionists and Secessionists fought on the side of the Confederacy under Pike's command.

While the actions of the Indian Brigade did not constitute a major part of the action, they did manage to overrun a Union artillery position and also successfully ambushed two companies of Iowa cavalry during the fighting. When the Confederate attack in the Leetown area faltered following the deaths of Generals Ben McCulloch and James McIntosh, the Native American soldiers joined the other Confederates on this section of the field in falling back.

Union soldiers combing the woods and fields for traces of fallen comrades came across the site where Pike's Indians had ambushed the Iowa cavalry companies and were shocked by the scene. Eight of the Iowa soldiers had been scalped and another 17 had been mutilated. The incident prompted outrage in the Union ranks, but was not considered particularly unusual by the Confederates on the western frontier. Native Americans of many tribes believed they were hampering their enemy's passage into the next world through such rituals.

After the Battle of Pea Ridge, some of the members of the Indian Brigade went on to fight for the Union for the rest of the war, although most of the soldiers remained loyal to the Confederacy until the bitter end. Some of these men were still with General Stand Watie when he became the last Confederate general to lay down his arms in 1865.

I'll post more on some other points of interest on the battlefield in the next post. Until then, you can learn more by visiting www.exploresouthernhistory.com/pearidgeindex. This weekend marks the 147th anniversary of the battle.



Wednesday, August 13, 2008

Cooper's Expedition to Fort Smith - Part Seven


Following the return of Gano and his men from the successful action at Massard Prairie, General Cooper began to consider the possibilities for a second move against Fort Smith.
Like the first attack, he did not intend for this action to involve an actual assault on the fortified city itself. His numbers were insufficient and the Federal position too strong for that. Instead, he hoped to once again snap up outlying Union units, capture supplies and create a diversion that would allow pro-Southern families in the area to evacuate under the protection of his troops.
The plan this time called for demonstrations against multiple points. Gano was ordered to sweep back down onto Massard Prairie to snap up any isolated units that might have moved back out. A second detachment, composed of Native American Confederate soldiers, was sent up the west bank of the Poteau to fire across into the garrison itself. Cooper then moved up with two columns on the main roads approaching Fort Smith from the south.
The famed Cherokee commander, Brigadier General Stand Watie, was now with the Confederates and he led the advance as the Southern troops moved up the Fort Towson and Line roads.
As our series continues in the next post, we will look at the action that resulted from this advance, remembered today as the Battle of Fort Smith. If you are interested in learning more, please consider my book The Battle of Massard Prairie: The 1864 Confederate Attacks on Fort Smith, Arkansas. It is available for order online at www.exploresouthernhistory.com/dalecox and is also available in the gift shops at Prairie Grove Battlefield State Park in Northwest Arkansas and at the Fort Smith Museum of History in Fort Smith.

Thursday, April 24, 2008

Massard Prairie, Part One

The summer of 1864 was a difficult time for the Union troops occupying Fort Smith. The Red River Campaign that spring had ended in disaster and the soldiers came back demoralized and worn down from the difficulties of the expedition.

By July, Confederate troops had swept back north through the Indian Territory (present-day Oklahoma) and had carried out successful attacks on the steamboat J.R. Williams and a Union outpost at Roseville, Arkansas.


Commanded by Gen. Douglas H. Cooper, they hovered around Fort Smith, watching and waiting for an opportunity to strike. The opportunity presented itself when Gen. John Thayer, the Union commander at Fort Smith, was forced to send out detachments of soldiers to guard herds and hay cutting parties sent into the area prairies to bring desperately needed fodder into the defenses of Fort Smith.


Confederate scouts soon picked up on these movements and relayed the intelligence back to Gen. Cooper, who had established his headquarters near the old Choctaw Council House in the Sans Bois Mountains southwest of Fort Smith. Deciding to strike against a force of "Arkansas Federals" (Union soldiers from Arkansas) that was camped just south of Fort Smith, he ordered Brig. Gen. Richard M. Gano to prepare a force of roughly 1,000 men for the attack.


Gano was a hard-riding Texas cavalry officer who had served with the famed Confederate raider John Hunt Morgan earlier in the war and then under Nathan Bedford Forrest at the Battle of Chickamauga. Now commanding the Texas mounted troops in the Trans-Mississippi Department, Gano had fought and been wounded during the Red River Campaign but by July of 1864 was in the Choctaw Nation, ready for action.

The Confederates had carried out attacks above and below Fort Smith. Brig. Gen. Stand Watie captured the steamboat J.R. Williams on the Arkansas River and another force struck a Union outpost at Roseville, downstream from the fort.

Union troops had heavily fortified Fort Smith, encircling the town with a series of earthen redoubts and rifle pits. General Cooper knew that he lacked both the artillery and sufficient troops to storm the works, but he kept scouts hovering around the town looking for targets of opportunity. The Federals soon provided them with exactly the chance they were seeking.

The Battle of Massard Prairie series will continue in the next post. Until then, you can read more by visiting www.exploresouthernhistory.com/massardprairie.

Tuesday, March 18, 2008

General Stand Watie at Fort Smith


Brig. Gen. Stand Watie, the only Native American to be commissioned as a general by the Confederacy, played an important role in the war along the Arkansas-Oklahoma border.
A Cherokee warrior, Gen. Watie was the owner of a large plantation before the war. A long-standing opponent of the John Ross party that then help power in the Cherokee government, Watie sided with the Confederacy while many of his political opponents sided with the Union.
His reputation as a bold and fearless cavalry leader was well deserved and he achieved some of the most dramatic victories of the Civil War.
On July 31, 1864, Watie took part in a bold demonstration against the Union defenses of Fort Smith. Hoping to snap up Federal outposts and supplies and provide military protection for local Southern sympathizers who wished to evacuate the area, Confederate Gen. Douglas H. Cooper moved up the Fort Towson Road (today's Towson Avenue) against the southern defenses of Fort Smith at sunrise.
The advance was headed by Watie, who overran a Union outpost and then drove retreating Federals ahead of him all the way up to the earthworks that ringed today's downtown area. It was a bold and rapid attack, characteristic of the general.
Cooper's demonstration was never intended to be a full assault on Fort Smith, but he used Watie's bold attack and a subsequent show of force to intimidate the Federals long enough to inflict considerable damage and allow civilians wishing to evacuate the chance to do so.

Tuesday, February 5, 2008

Fort Smith - Confluence of the Arkansas and Poteau


This photograph shows the confluence of the Arkansas and Poteau Rivers as seen from Fort Smith National Historic Site. A vital strategic point, the confluence was within easy range of the artillery of the fort.
During the late spring and summer of 1864, the water level in the rivers was much higher than normal. This allowed continued use of the Arkansas by Union steamboats during a time of the year when low water usually stopped the boats from running. Throughout the summer, the boats continued running up and down the river to Little Rock, as well as upstream to Fort Gibson (Fort Blount) in the Indian Territory (today's Oklahoma).
The continued operation of the boats created attack opportunities for Confederate troops as they surged north into the Arkansas River valley following the defeat of the Union army in the Arkansas phase of the Red River Campaign.
In mid-June, Confederate forces under Col. Stand Watie, who was promoted to become the South's only Native American brigadier general at about the same time, laid an artillery ambush upstream from Fort Smith and opened fire on the steamboat J.R. Williams. The boat was carrying provisions and other military supplies upstream from Fort Smith to Fort Gibson (Fort Blount). Watie's cannon disabled the vessel and his men succeeded in capturing it. Removing all the supplies they could, the Confederates fired the vessel and destroyed it.
Union soldiers at Fort Smith, including Private Henry Strong of the 12th Kansas Infantry, wrote of seeing barrels of flour and other debris from the attack float by on the river.
More posts on Fort Smith National Historic Site are on the way, but in the meantime you can read more about the fort by going to www.exploresouthernhistory.com and looking for the link under the "Arkansas" heading at the bottom of the page.